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We study Twitter data from a dynamical systems perspective. In particular, we focus on the
large set of data released by Twitter Inc. and asserted to represent a Russian influence operation.
We propose a mathematical model to describe the per-day tweet production that can be extracted
using spectral analysis. We show that this mathematical model allows us to construct families
(clusters) of users with common harmonics. We define a labeling scheme describing user strategy
in an information operation and show that the resulting strategies correspond to the behavioral
clusters identified from their harmonics. We then compare these user clusters to the ones derived
from text data using a graph-based topic analysis method. We show that spectral properties of the
user clusters are related to the number of user-topic groups represented in a spectral cluster. Bulk
data analysis also provides new insights into the data set in the context of prior work.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we analyze a data set purported to rep-
resent Russian troll twitter messages, provided by Twit-
ter Inc. [1, 2] using techniques from dynamical systems
analysis. There have been several reports on data re-
leased by Twitter representing what is believed to be
disinformation originating from Russian state-controlled
accounts. Of particular focus has been possible targeted
interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. How-
ever, evidence continues to mount that foreign influence
campaigns operationalized through social media remain
a persistent threat.
The data discussed in this paper and closely related
data have been analyzed by several other authors. Man-
ual analysis using data scraped from Twitter by Clemson
University suggests that Russian twitter agents were pro-
NRA [3]. Griffin and Bickel [4, 5] initially reported on
the use of unsupervised machine learning for extracting
information from a subset of the data analyzed in this pa-
per that was provided by NBC News [6]. Kellner et al. [7]
analyze this data set to investigate influence in the Ger-
man Federal election. Im et al. [8] build language-based
classifiers for twitter bots using this data set. Cable and
Hugh [9] as well as Lim et al. [10] study the problem
of detecting twitter bots using general machine learn-
ing techniques. In addition, several reports have been
written on the subject including the well known Mueller
Report [11].
The objective of this paper is to investigate the data
provided by Twitter Inc. from a dynamical systems per-
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spective. We propose a mathematical model to describe
the per-day tweet rate (as the dynamic system) for a
subset of the user (bot) population and show how this
model leads to a coherent set of user clusters based on
the dynamic behavior. In addition, we construct a novel
strategy assignment for message data and show that clus-
tered accounts yield consistent strategic behaviors. We
then compare these clusters to constructed topic clusters
(using the method in [4]) and show that message content
diversity is directly linked to diversity in per-day tweet
rate. Subsequently, we treat some of the assertions made
in [4] as registered hypotheses and use the larger data set
to validate or refute them.
The aim of this work is substantively different from the
literature on bot and fake news detection [12–17], as it
is from the work on general modeling of tweet dynamics
[18, 19]. To our knowledge, we are the first to adopt a
dynamical systems approach to describe information op-
erations, and in particular, the strategic behavior of co-
ordinated actors in this space. As the detrimental effects
of these operations are continually brought to our atten-
tion (e.g., [20]), the need for robust, formal approaches to
modeling increasingly sophisticated strategic actors has
become clear.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
Section II we discuss notation and some pre-requisite in-
formation. Bulk data analysis is considered in Section III.
We then turn to specific dynamical systems inspired anal-
ysis of the data set in Section IV. The results from this
analysis is compared and expanded using topic analy-
sis in Section V. Conclusions and future directions are
presented in Section VI. Two appendices include specific
information generated from the unsupervised clustering
approaches discussed.
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2II. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section we establish notation and fundamental
definitions needed for the remainder of this paper. All
vectors are assumed to be column vectors unless stated
otherwise and are denoted by boldface symbols in lower
case; matrices are denoted by boldface symbols in up-
per case. An m dimensional vector x = 〈x1, . . . , xm〉
has components that are unbolded and indexed. If
X ∈ Rm×n is a matrix, then XT ∈ Rn×m is its trans-
pose. If x = {xt}t is a time series, then its discrete
Fourier transform is denoted xˆ = {xˆω}ω = F(x).
A. Bag of Words Space
We use a bag-of-words (BOW) formalism in this paper
because we are interested in a dynamical system anal-
ysis of data that is linked to text. This approach has
been extensively used. The interested reader may con-
sult [21] as a reference. Assume there is a finite dic-
tionary of words (or symbols) W with size m. Assume
W = {w1, w2, . . . , wm} is ordered, i is the index of word
wi, and associate with word wi the Euclidean unit vec-
tor ei via the map g(w
i) = ei. In a BOW model, the
representation g is extended to any sequence of words
(w1 · w2 · · ·wk) in the following way:
x = g(w1 · w2 · · ·wk) =
k∑
i=1
g(wi) (1)
The cosine metric between two vectors x and y in Rm is
given by:
d(x,y) = 1− 〈x,y〉‖x‖ · ‖y‖ ,
where ‖·‖ denotes the standard Euclidean metric and 〈·, ·〉
is the standard Euclidean inner product. When x,y ≥ 0
(and non-zero), then d(x,y) ≤ 1 and 1 − d(x,y) is the
cosine similarity.
B. Twitter Dataset
We assume a passing familiarity with the micro-
blogging service Twitter. Each Twitter user generates
short broadcast messages (tweets) that can refer to any
other user by their username prepended with the @ sym-
bol. A Twitter user who follows another Twitter user will
receive the broadcast tweets made by that user. A tweet
is defined as a retweet if it is a repost of another user’s
tweet. Users can be directionally connected through the
act of retweeting forming a retweet network. See [22].
For an arbitrary sampling frequency (e.g., once per
hour, once per day, etc.) the output of a Twitter user
creates two discrete time series of interest. These can be
thought of as observations from a dynamic system. Fix
a user i. During sampling period t a word sequence M it
is observed which contains the concatenated tweets sent
by user i during period t.
X =
{
g
(
M it
)}
t
(2)
The second time series of interest is the tweet count series
which simply counts the number of tweets sent by user i
during period k. We denote this
{
νit
}
t
or in functional
form νi(t). In Section V, we use two timescales for topic
analysis to compensate for the fact that tweets are short
texts and therefore, short timescales are not instructive
for understanding the behavior of the dynamical system
in message space.
In this work, we are interested in the generation and
representation of content by the IRA user group within
Twitter, as identified by by Twitter Inc. For this reason,
we categorize tweets in one of three ways:
Original: A tweet by an IRA user is original if it is not
a retweet of any other user’s content.
Spreading: A tweet by an IRA user is spreading if it is
a retweet of another user’s content and that user is
within the IRA user group.
Amplifying: A tweet by an IRA user is amplifying if it
is a retweet of another user’s content and that user
is outside the IRA user group.
Assigning these descriptors to a tweet can be done auto-
matically. The data set provides information on whether
a tweet is a retweet and if so who is being retweeted. It
is then straightforward to check whether the user who is
retweeted is part of the IRA data set.
C. User Strategy Space
Define:
∆n =
{
x ∈ Rn :
∑
i
xi = 1, xi ≥ 0
}
This is the (n-1)-dimensional simplex embedded in
Rn and used extensively in three-strategy evolutionary
games (see e.g., [23]).
We represent user i’s decision to post an original,
spreading or amplifying tweet as strategic. Any time
νi(t) > 0, we can divide user i’s tweets into these three
categories and calculate the three dimensional strategy
vector:
pii(t) =
〈
νi1(t)
νi(t)
,
νi2(t)
νi(t)
,
νi3(t)
νi(t)
〉
, (3)
where νij(t) is the number of times strategy j is selected
by user i during time period t. Each strategy vector
pii(t) ∈ ∆3. Thus, {piit}t is a time series of mixed strate-
gies in ∆3. To understand this dynamical system, we will
3adopt a symbolization of ∆3 allowing us to study (at a
gross scale) the distribution of user strategies over longer
time periods in the data. The symbolization is shown in
Fig. 1. Denote by
{
σit
} ⊂ ∆3 the symbolized strategy se-
FIG. 1: A symbolization of ∆3 that will be used in
analyzing user behavior.
quence of User i, where σit ∈ A = {A,B,C,D,E, F,G}.
III. BULK DATA ANALYSIS
Twitter Inc. maintains the Twitter Elections’ Integrity
Hub.1 This site contains tweets and accounts alleged to
be part of a Russian active measures campaign against
the West, led by the Internet Research Agency (IRA).
In the datasets shared on the site, all user names for ac-
counts with less than 5000 followers are hashed, that is,
user names have been obscured through a string hashing
function. Un-hashed versions of this data can be obtained
upon request to Twitter Inc. Data analysis in this paper
was performed with the un-hashed version. User account
information will be protected2 unless it is already clear
that the user is a known figure and has appeared in a
publicly available data set; e.g., the user TEN GOP is men-
tioned in the Mueller report [11].
The data set we use is an aggregate of the October
2018, January 2019, and June 2019 batch releases on the
Elections’ Integrity Hub. Our combined data set consists
of 8, 768, 633 individual tweets spanning over 9 years.
There are 3, 116 users identified in the data. Fig. 2 shows
the number of tweets per month over the time spanned by
the data set. Others authors [4, 7, 24–27] have spent sub-
stantial time correlating twitter activity to world events
and there is non-trivial correlation to these events.
The internal retweet network of IRA users (see Fig. 3)
suggests a somewhat fragmented network with the top
1 Twitter maintains a current repository of all public, non-
deleted tweets and media from accounts believed to be con-
nected to state-backed information operations here: https://
transparency.twitter.com/en/information-operations.html.
2 Usernames which were hashed in the publically released dataset
are represeted in the paper as hashed xx and a mapping to the
full hashed usernames is provided in Appendix D.
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FIG. 2: A temporal histogram showing the total
distribution of IRA tweets over a period from May-2009
to June 2018.
retweeted accounts tweeting primarily in Russian. We
identify 28 communities in the retweet network using
modularity-based community detection. Fragmentation
FIG. 3: The retweet network amongst IRA accounts
over the complete dataset. Using modularity-based
community detection, we identify 28 communities and
attain modularity of 0.395.
within the retweet network will be mirrored in the dy-
namical systems analysis in the sequel, suggesting that a
consistent picture emerges at multiple scales of analysis.
A. English Language Tweets
We now focus on English language tweets because this
will allow us to test hypotheses posed in [4] using the full
data set provided by Twitter Inc. In [4] the Mathemat-
ica language detector was used to classify tweet language.
In our present dataset, Twitter Inc. has provided a lan-
guage for each tweet in the data set under investigation.
We note that the accuracy of Twitter’s language detector
is unknown. A temporal histogram of English language
tweets is shown in Fig. 4. For simplicity, we focus our
study in English on the time period between January 1,
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FIG. 4: A temporal histogram showing the total
distribution of English language IRA tweets over the
data set.
2015 and December 31, 2017. This includes the 2016 US
presidential election as well as the majority (88.86%) of
English tweets in the data set. In the sequel, we will fo-
cus even more specifically on users who tweet sufficiently
often to ensure that derived time series are not subject
to small sample problems.
1. Model of tweet frequency
Let {N(t)}t denote the total number of tweets posted
in English each day between January 1, 2015 and Decem-
ber 31, 2017 and let the accumulation function be given
by:
S(t) =
∑
s≤t
N(s) (4)
This function is shown in Fig. 5. Visual inspection sug-
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FIG. 5: The English Tweet accumulation function from
January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2017 appears
piecewise linear.
gests that the function is piecewise linear. Griffin and
Bickel [4] propose the hypothesis that there is a change
point in the behavioral (tweet frequency) dynamics on or
about the start of the Republican National Convention
(July 18, 2016). The complete data picture suggests that
this hypothesis is not correct. However, we can support
the hypothesis that there is a change point in the to-
tal messaging velocity N(t) at some point near the 2016
presidential election. To see this, we fit two linear models
of the form:
Sˆj(t) = βj0 + β
j
1(t− tj0) (5)
The first model uses data from S(t) starting on July
20, 2015 and ending on September 8, 2016. The second
model uses data from S(t) starting on September 9, 2016
and ending on May 9, 2017. The fits for these models are
both shown in Fig. 5. Both models have r2−Adj > 0.99
(i.e., more than 99% of the variance in the data is ex-
plained by the linear models). Moreover statistically we
can show that a change point occurs at some point in
the data set near September 8 by observing the model
parameters:
Model 1 Parameters:
Estimate Std. Error Confidence Interval
1 783392. 1250.53 (777648., 789136.)
t− 200 1973.81 5.20356 (1949.91, 1997.71)
Model 2 Parameters:
Estimate Std. Error Confidence Interval
1 1.58438× 106 950.379 (1.57996× 106, 1.5888× 106)
t− 616 3647.54 6.76713 (3616.05, 3679.03)
The 5σ confidence intervals on β11 and β
2
1 are non-
intersecting, thus suggesting that these two linear mod-
els are different. Thus, if S(t) is modeled by a piecewise
function of the form in Eq. (5), then with high confidence
we can assert there is a change point in this function near
t20 = 616 (September 9, 2016).
2. Model of tweet strategy
We illustrate that in addition to a change in messaging
rate, there is also a change point in the strategy used by
the IRA users. Here we consider the symbolic dynamic
systems {σit}t for all users i sampled daily. We compare
the distribution of visited partition elements in A before
and after September 9, 2016, the change point used in
the previous analysis. Define the indicator:
Iα(σ
i
t) =
{
1 σit = α
0 otherwise
,
and define the discrete distributions:
p1(α) =
∑
i
∑
t∈[t10,t20) Iα(σ
i
t)∑
α
∑
i
∑
t∈[t10,t20) Iα(σ
i
t)
p2(α) =
∑
i
∑
t∈[t20,tf ) Iα(σ
i
t)∑
α
∑
i
∑
t∈[t20,tf ) Iα(σ
i
t)
where tf is May 10, 2017. All data up to tf are consid-
ered. The two distributions are shown in Fig. 6. It is
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FIG. 6: The discrete distributions of visiting patterns of
the symbolic dynamical systems {σit}t in two temporal
regions identified.
clear (visually) that these two distributions are distinct.
However, we compute χ2 = 30, 827 using p1(α) as the
reference distribution. Thus, with extremely high cer-
tainty we can assert that a strategy change occurred at
some point between 2016 and 2017. In particular, IRA
users shifted their most common strategy from posting
original tweets to posting amplifying tweets. This pat-
tern is investigated further in the sequel when we focus
on the subset of IRA users who post the highest volume
of tweets.
IV. SPECTRAL ANALYSIS OF THE
DYNAMICAL SYSTEM
Observing samples from νi(t) for (almost) any arbi-
trary user illustrates that the underlying dynamics of
users is non-stationary. This is illustrated in Fig. 7 using
TEN GOP, however any user would suffice. To analyze the
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FIG. 7: The non-stationary dynamics of TEN GOP serve
as an example of the non-stationary behavior of most
users. The drop in activity after the election is shown
with the dashed lines.
data set as a dynamical system, we now restrict our at-
tention to two shorter time periods and a smaller set of
users. We select users in the 90th percentile for total vol-
ume of tweets from January 1, 2015 through December
31, 2017. In particular, these users posted at least 1, 093
tweets during this period. Restricting to this set of users
ensures there is sufficient text information available to
make analysis of message content meaningful. We refer
to this set of 312 users by the set U∗. Moreover, we re-
strict our investigation to the time periods from March 9,
2016 to November 8, 2016 and November 29, 2016 to July
31, 2017. Both of these time periods are 244 days long.
This ensures we have a sufficient time span for a mean-
ingful time series analysis. Note we omit the period im-
mediately after the 2016 US presidential election because
many users had a dramatic decrease in their output. This
is illustrated in Fig. 7. Finally, in order to ensure we have
sufficient observations within each of the 244-day time
periods, we consider only those users who tweet at least
once per day over 60% of the days surveyed. As a result,
we analyze 24 user dynamics during the March 9, 2016
- November 8, 2016 time period and 117 user dynamics
during the November 29, 2016 - July 31, 2017 time pe-
riod. The usernames considered within each of the two
periods are provided in Appendix B. These two sets of
users will be denoted U∗1 and U∗2 .
The objective of the remainder of this section is to
illustrate that the behavior of some users in U∗1 and U∗2
can be described by noisy quasi-periodic functions and
can be grouped by common operational frequencies. We
further show how these groups produce consistent topical
content and use consistent strategies.
A. Families of Quasi-Periodic Behavior
Using a small subset of the data used in this paper, [4]
observed that some Twitter users exhibit periodic behav-
ior. In this section we test this observation for multiple
users in U∗, including TEN GOP, the user discussed in [4].
We show that in this larger data set the following model
describes a subset (88.8%) of per-day user tweet volume
in both the pre- and post-election time periods we con-
sider:
νi(t) = µi(u) +
∑
j
Aij(u) cos
(
ω
[i]
j t+ ϕ
i
j
)
+ i(t). (6)
Here µi(t) is a drift term affected by a (hidden) control
signal u, Ai(u) is an amplitude affected by the same u, ϕi
is a phase specific to i and ω[i] is a frequency common to
members of a group [i] to which user i belongs. The term
i(t) ∼ (0, σi) is a mean-zero noise term. More impor-
tantly, the parameter ω[i] exhibits some consistency over
the two time periods, though some users do switch their
fundamental frequencies. Furthermore, the data suggest
that the number of terms in the Fourier expansion (in-
dexed by j) is generally small (6 or fewer); therefore we
assume the sum in Eq. (6) is finite. We note that not all
users can be modeled this way, with some users exhibit-
ing extremely noisy or bursty behavior.
Before discussing the full set of data from U∗, we il-
lustrate the phenomena we discuss using TEN GOP. This
allows us to confirm the hypothesis set out in [4] that
this user has a periodicity of 4 days in his/her tweet pat-
tern. Note first from Fig. 7 that there is a trend in the
underlying data. To compensate for the trend, we use
6a detrended price oscillator approach [28] replacing νi(t)
(the daily tweet volume) with:
ξi(t) = νi(t)− ν¯iSM,7(t).
Here ν¯iSM,7 is the simple 7 day moving average prior to t.
The result of detrending is shown in Fig. 8. Notice the
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FIG. 8: The detrended dynamics of TEN GOP removes
some of the linear growth shown around the run up the
2016 US presidential election.
de-trended data do not show a linear increase in the run
up to the 2016 US presidential election. Removing these
trends also allows dominant frequencies in the spectrum
to appear more clearly. Thus we can replace Eq. (6) with
the more convenient expression:
ξi(t) =
∑
j
Aij(u) cos
(
ω
[i]
j t+ ϕ
i
j
)
+ i(t). (7)
The Fourier transform and a fit using 6 terms for ξ(t) for
TEN GOP is shown in Fig. 9 for the period before and af-
ter the 2016 US elections. We note that in both spectra
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FIG. 9: (Top) Fourier spectra for TEN GOP before and
after the 2016 US Presidential Election. (Bottom)
Corresponding fit using a 6 term Fourier sequence.
there is a high amplitude frequency at bin 60 indicat-
ing a cyclic behavior recurring (approximately) every 4
days. This is consistent with the results found in [4]. We
also note that there are a reasonably small number of
high amplitude frequencies, particularly before the elec-
tion. For completeness we illustrate the spectra and fit
of KansasDailyNews in Appendix A. This user has much
more periodic behavior and a cleaner spectrum.
B. Behavior Spectrum Clustering
Before proceeding, we layout the general analytic pro-
cedure to be followed in determining families of behavior
describing ξi(t).
1. Cluster users based on the spectra of ξi(t), thereby
constructing the family [i].
2. Compare the derived clusters between the two time
periods.
3. Examine the trajectories pii(t) for those individuals
in [i] to determine whether there is a correlation
between tweet strategy and tweet volume.
In Section V, we discuss clustering users in word space
and relate these clusters to the behavioral clusters.
Even after detrending the data, the spectra in Fig. 9
are noisy. This is common to all users and is described by
the noise term i(t). To address noise in the spectra, we
apply a de-noising procedure and following [29], we use
a principal components analysis to project the spectra
onto a lower-dimensional space.
The spectral de-noising procedure is simple: we zero
out frequency bins whose square amplitude is in the bot-
tom q-percentile. For this data, we used q = 0.33. Let
D(xˆ, q) denote the de-noising procedure on a Fourier
transform xˆ using quantile q as a threshold. For each
user pi ∈ U∗p (p ∈ {1, 2}) this leaves a matrix:
Ξp =
 ξˆ
T
p1
...
ξˆTpm
 ,
where:
ξˆpi = D [F (ξpi) , q]
is the de-noised Fourier transform of the time series ξpi =
{ξpit }t. We then apply principal components analysis [30]
to the data in Ξp. The result is a reduced dimensional
data set that exhibits good separation. The eigenvalues
of the covariance matrix computed during the principal
components analysis for both the pre- and post-election
data sets are shown in Fig. 10. We note in both cases that
there is a knee in the curve of the eigenvalues after the
third eigenvalue. Therefore, we reconstruct the data in
three dimensional space. Visual inspection of the reduced
dimensional data suggests that the data may divide into
four clusters. We use the k-medoid method [31] to cluster
the data. The results are shown in Fig. 11.
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FIG. 10: The eigenvalues of the covariance matrices
obtained during principal components analysis of the
de-noised Fourier transforms of the de-trended per-day
volume data suggest three components adequately
describe the data.
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FIG. 11: The reduced dimension clusters of spectral
data show reasonable separation in three-dimensional
space for both pre- and post-election data.
The resulting clusters each have specific spectral prop-
erties that define them. These are shown in Fig. 13,
where we use box-and-whisker plots to show the ranges of
each frequency bin over all elements of the cluster. Clus-
ter 1 is composed of users whose behavior is not mod-
eled by Eq. (7), except to say that their per-day tweet
volume is composed of noise; i.e., there is no dominant
frequency in their spectra. Cluster 2 is composed of users
like TEN GOP whose behavior is harmonic with period (ap-
proximately) 4 days. This cluster could be sub-divided
in the post-election period since we can see a substantial
amount of variation in the lower-frequency amplitudes.
The 4 day periodicity is clearer in the pre-election period.
Clusters 3 and 4 both have extremely sharp defining prin-
cipal frequencies between bins 30 and 35 (corresponding
to a 7 day periodicity). Cluster 3 has a second frequency
spike between bin 60 and 65, implying a periodicity of
4 days like Cluster 2. Cluster 4 has a second frequency
spike between bins 100 and 105, corresponding to a faster
2-3 day cycle, which is difficult to explain from a practical
perspective. These results support Eq. (7) as modeling
the tweet rate of the users in this data set and also sup-
port the idea that these accounts are controlled Twitter
bots [7, 9, 32].
The user names in the themselves have interest-
ing semantic properties. In both the pre-election
period and the post-election period, Cluster 3 con-
sists of user names that appear to be regionally se-
lected news sources. For example, OnlineMemphis,
KansasDailyNews and ChicagoDailyNew are all in Clus-
ter 3. However, there are some interesting anomalies to
this rule. DetroitDailyNew and DailySanJose both ap-
pear in Cluster 1 in the post-election time period. This
can be explained by anomalies in their spectra. (See
Fig. 12.) While both users have a spike between bins 30
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FIG. 12: Two anomalies appear in the automatic
behavior clustering. From a user name perspective,
DetroitDailyNew and DailySanJose should be in
Cluster 3.
and 35, DetroitDailyNew has a second frequency spike
between bin 60 and 65 like TEN GOP, while DailySanJose
has some low frequency noise and a frequency spike be-
tween bins 100 and 105, consistent with Cluster 4. The
confusion results in these two users being placed in Clus-
ter 1.
We analyze the strategic behavior present in the clus-
ters in Fig. 13. The three strategies are shown along with
the sample points and a smoothed density histogram of
the strategies. The weighted mean point of the strate-
gies is shown as an open circle (in red). Consistent with
the results illustrated in Fig. 6, there is a transition from
the originate strategy to the amplify strategy for users
in Cluster 1, 2 and 4. We note, however, that Cluster 3,
which contains users with news-related names, continues
to follow the originate strategy both before and after the
US presidential election. It is also interesting to note that
Cluster 2 (which contains TEN GOP) maintains a balance
between the originate and amplify strategies in contrast
to users in Clusters 1 and 4.
V. TOPICAL EXTRACTION BEHAVIOR
CORRELATION
In this section, we construct a second set of clusters
during the pre- and post-election periods based on the
topics mentioned in posted tweets. We investigate the
word-space dynamical system over two long time periods,
and then compare the resulting clusters of behaviors (and
extracted topics) with the clusters derived in the previous
sections. We show evidence to support the hypothesis
that the better-modeled a cluster is by Eq. (7), the fewer
topical-user clusters are represented, that is, the greater
the topical cohesion observed.
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(c) Pre-Election Cluster 3
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FIG. 13: Both pre- and post-election spectra and the corresponding strategies are illustrated. The four clusters in
the pre-election period can be matched the four clusters in the post-election period showing consistent dynamics
across time periods exit. Strategies show a clear transition from originating to amplifying in some clusters but not in
others.
9A. Algorithm for User Clustering by Text
We discuss the algorithm (Algorithm 1) used to gen-
erate clusters of users by their topical signatures. Algo-
rithm 1 is a compilation of several pre-existing methods
in natural language processing [21] and manifold learning
[33, 34] with a novel variant that makes use of graph an-
alytics developed in the physics community [35–37]. For
this reason, we present the algorithm in detail.
We assume some minimal knowledge from statistical
language processing. In particular, a stopword is a word
with little value to text meaning; examples in English in-
clude “the” and “a”. Word stemming removes common
endings to ground the text into a more systematic vocab-
ulary. For example, “ending” is replaced with “end”.
We assume the input is a sequence of tweets and users.
In Line 1, the tweets from User i are concatenated to
form a synthetic document. For the remainder of this
algorithm, if w is a word, let #(w, i) be the number of
times User i uses word w. In Line 2, the words in the
document are passed through a stemmer. Since we did
not know that multiple languages were in use a priori,
we used the standard English (Porter) stemmer available
in Mathematica 11.3. However, multiple stemmers and
language detectors could be used at this step. In Line
3, we use a custom stopword list consisting of the (stems
of) most common words in a language. Again, this was
specialized to English, however it is possible to generalize
this step. The remaining non-stopwords were used to
create term count vectors for each user in Line 4. In Line
5, a binary term-user matrix is constructed. The entries
are indicators determining whether a term is used by a
user. A dynamic stopword set is initialized in Step 7. In
Lines 8 - 10, we iterate through the term-user matrix and
determine whether a term is used by more than p×100%
of the users, with p ∈ (0, 1). For our study we set p = 0.5.
The rows corresponding to the words that were used by
more than p× 100% are added to T .
After deleting the dynamic stopwords, we identify key-
words across all documents in Lines 13 - 18 using fre-
quency. While it is the case that many documents follow
the Zipf-Mandelbrot law and their word counts follow a
Zipf-Mandelbrot distribution [38, 39], we have found it
useful to smooth these distributions and use a percentile
cutoff. To do this, we fit a Gamma distribution to the
word counts and then remove words that do not fall in the
q×100% percentile of the distribution. For this study, we
set q = 0.9. We chose the Gamma distribution because
it has non-negative support, and being a two parame-
ter distribution is widely adaptable. We note, there are
alternate way of identifying keywords [21].
After removing non-keywords, the term and user set
is fixed and a new term-user matrix X˜ can be computed
where each column is the (reduced term) term counts for
the corresponding user. In Line 26, we then replace each
column of X˜, denoted X˜i with its unit vector form. That
is, column i of X˜ becomes X˜i/‖X˜‖.
To understand the remainder of the algorithm, we
Input: Raw tweets with users
Result: Clusters of Users
1: Concatenate tweets per user to make documents
2: Stem all words in documents
3: Remove stopwords by their stems
4: Generate word counts per user
5: Create binary term-user matrix:
Xij ←
{
1 If User j uses term i
0 otherwise
6: Define {nr, nc} ← Dimensions[X]
7: Define T ← ∅
8: for i ∈ {1, . . . , nr} do
9: if
∑
jXij > p · nc then
10: T ← T ∪ {i}
11: end if
12: end for
13: Delete all terms corresponding to indexes in T
14: Set T ← ∅.
15: for i ∈ {1, . . . , nc} do
16: Compute mean word count w¯ and word count variance
S2w for User i.
17: Fit a Gamma distribution Γ(k, θ) for User i’s word use
with:
k =
w¯2
S2w
θ =
S2
w¯
18: for Each word used by User i do
19: if #(w, i) is in the q×100% percentile of Γ(k, θ) then
20: T ← T ∪ {w}.
21: end if
22: end for
23: end for
24: Delete all terms not in T .
25: Create new term-user matrix: X˜ij is the number of times
User j uses term i.
26: Replace each column of X˜i with X˜i/‖X˜i‖.
27: Compute modified adjacency matrix: A← X˜T · X˜
28: Compute A˜ by zeroing the diagonal of A
29: Set Bi ← kth largest value in Ai·
30: for i ∈ {1, . . . , nc} do
31: for j ∈ {1, . . . , nc} do
32: if A˜ij < min{Bi, Bj} then
33: A˜ij ← 0
34: end if
35: end for
36: end for
37: Create weighted graph G with weight matrix A˜
38: Cluster vertices using maximum modularity clustering.
ALGORITHM 1: Construct User Clusters from
Linguistic Features
think of X as a sub-matrix of the weighted adjacency
matrix B of a bipartite graph between terms and docu-
ments where:
B˜ =
[
0 X˜
X˜T 0
]
Suppose that B has the same structure as B˜, but with
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all positive values replaced by 1. It is a classic result in
graph theory that B2 has in its (i, j) position the number
of walks of length 2 from vertex i to vertex j. Thus, if X
is again the binarized form of X˜, then:
B2 =
[
X ·XT 0
0 XT ·X
]
Here XT · X is a square matrix whose (i, j) position is
the number of terms shared between User i and User j
when i 6= j. By normalizing the columns of X˜ in Line
26, we ensure that the (i, j) element of X˜T · X˜ is just
the cosine similarity measure of the term vectors used by
User i and User j (when i 6= j).
In Lines 27-29, we create the adjacency matrix A˜ by
using the process described above and zero the diago-
nal. We then compute bounds (define neighbors) for each
user, by finding the kth largest value. This is the graph
theoretic equivalent of using k-nearest neighbors [40]. In
our work we set k = 10. In Lines 30 - 36, we zero an
edge weight (i.e., delete edges) at index (i, j) if it is less
than the bound computed for user i or user j. In essence,
this creates a version of a preferential attachment graph
where (i) preference is based on shared topics, (ii) each
user prefers to attach to k other users but (iii) user i
may attach to more than k users if there are more than k
other users who have ranked user i as one of their top k
connections. If modeled as a directed graph, this would
be an (nc, k) directed Barabasi-Albert network [41] with
a hidden preference based on topic.
Finally, in Lines 37 - 38, we form the graph and
use maximum modularity clustering defined by Newman
[35] to build user communities. This is a variation on
the Isomap [33] and Multidimensional Scaling [42] ap-
proaches to manifold learning.
B. User-Topic Clustering Results
Applying Algorithm 1 yields 5 language-based user
clusters in the pre-election period and 7 language-based
clusters in the post-election period. The resulting user
graphs generated in Line 37 of Algorithm 1 are shown
in Fig. 14 along with the resulting maximum modularity
clusters [35] generated in Line 38. The user clusters are
listed in Appendix C.
We can generate word clouds from the user clusters by
merging the stemmed, non-stop words used by the indi-
viduals in these clusters. This provides general informa-
tion about the topical information that caused the users
to be clustered. For the word clouds shown in Fig. 14,
we do not remove common words.
Topics emergent in the pre-election time period are
largely consistent with what is already known about this
twitter data set [8–11]. There are two groups whose com-
ments may be designed to stoke racial tension (Word
Clouds 1 and 4), one group that focuses on news (Word
Cloud 5), one group devoted to politics (Word Cloud 3)
and in particular Donald Trump, and a final group that
seems to re-tweet information from a variety of twitter
handles (Word Cloud 2).
Topics in the post-election time period are similar, but
with some apparent changes in composition. In partic-
ular, one cluster (Word Cloud 1) seems to be the result
of posts about the holiday(s) that occurred during the
post-election period. There is a user group that focuses
on news (Word Cloud 3). Interestingly, this group con-
tains the majority of the news-themed user names (e.g.,
KansasDailyNews). There are at least two groups that
post on race relations (Word Clouds 6 and 7). The re-
maining groups seem to focus on music (Word Cloud
2) and general topics related to Donald Trump (Word
Clouds 5 and 6) with various subtle language differences
separating these groups. As is to be expected based on
the Mueller report, TEN GOP is a member of post election
user group 5 and pre-election user group 3.
C. Comparison with Previous Clusters
We compare the spectrum-based cluster in the pre- and
post-election time periods with the topic-based clusters.
This is shown in Fig. 15.
We noted in Section IV that clusters 3 and 4 in both
the pre- and post-election periods had the clearest defin-
ing spectral characteristics. It is not surprising, therefore,
that these groups of users show the least topical diver-
sity. Members of pre-election (spectral) cluster 3 can be
found only in pre-election user-topic cluster 5 (the news
cluster), while members of pre-election (spectral) cluster
4 can be found only in pre-election user-topic cluster 2.
In a similar pattern, members of post-election (spectral)
cluster 3 are members of post-election user-topic cluster
3 (a news cluster). Members of post-election (spectral)
cluster 4 are members of post-election user-topic clus-
ters 1 (holiday) and 4 (Trump-related). Other spectral
clusters have users that are more spread out, correspond-
ing to less well-defined spectral properties. It is possible
to create sub-clusterings of the users corresponding to
both their topics and their spectra. This helps to de-
crease noise in the spectral clusters. We illustrate this
using post-election spectral cluster 2 and post-election
user-topic cluster 4. The smaller cluster contains only
the users hashed 26, Jenn Abrams, Pamela Moore13,
TEN GOP,TheFoundingSon, and todayinsyria, but has a
clear dominating frequency corresponding to a 4 day pe-
riod. This is shown in Fig. 16. Exhaustive sub-clustering
using both frequency and user-topic information is left
for future work.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed the IRA data provided
by Twitter Inc. from a dynamical systems perspective.
We proposed a mathematical model to describe the per-
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(d) Post-Election Word Clouds
FIG. 14: Topical user networks and clusters are generated by Algorithm 1 for pre- and post-election data (a,b).
Word clouds represent frequent topics in each cluster (c,d).
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FIG. 15: A comparison of the spectrum-based user
clustering and the topic-based user clustering shows
that user groups with well defined spectra have lower
topic diversity.
day tweet output of a subset of the users and showed
that this model could be validated using spectral anal-
ysis. This analysis allowed us to cluster user behavior
in a way that was distinct from prior language-based
work. We also developed a novel strategy assignment
that allowed us to label each tweet as being original to
the IRA, amplifying of external information or spreading
existing IRA information. We showed that a subset of the
spectral clusters had interpretable strategic behaviors.
We also showed the existence of a substantial behavioral
shift within the English data set from originating infor-
mation to amplifying external information just after the
2016 US presidential election. Finally, we compared the
spectrally-derived user clusters to clusters derived from
topics discussed and showed that more cohesive spectral
clusters (based on the distinctiveness of frequency peaks)
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FIG. 16: The spectral box-and-whiskers chart that
results from intersecting a spectral cluster and a
user-topic cluster. The dominant frequency is now
clearer.
also have greater topical cohesion. We used this observa-
tion to illustrate the utility of sub-clustering using both
dynamic behavior and linguistic features.
In future work, we may investigate joint clustering
based on dynamic behavior and linguistic features. Ad-
ditionally, it would be very instructive to conduct a very
large scale analysis on general Twitter data to determine
whether there are hidden attractors or fractal proper-
ties within the per-day (or per-week) time series. While
this data set seems large (9M+ tweets), in reality many
of the users exhibited bursty behavior making it prac-
tically impossible to reconstruct an attracting set. In
the case of this data set, the presence of dominant fre-
quencies strongly suggests that chaotic behavior is not
present. However, this fact may be an important feature
in differentiating bots from humans, who might exhibit
far more organic (and therefore complex) tweeting pat-
terns. In any future investigation with even more data
the application of more sophisticated analytical methods
using wavelet analysis or (at a minimum) spectrograms
might be more instructive in understanding bursty data.
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Appendix A: Alternative Spectrum and Fit Example
In this appendix, we provide an alternate spectrum
and fit example from a KansasDailyNews (see Figure 17).
This user has a 7 day period and is substantially less noisy
that many other users.
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FIG. 17: (Top) Fourier spectra for KansasDailyNews
before and after the 2016 US Presidential Election.
(Bottom) Corresponding fit using a 3 term Fourier
sequence.
Appendix B: Spectrum Clustered User IDs for each
Time Period
The following user names are associated to the two pe-
riods of investigation. We have clustered them according
to their primary frequencies of posting.
Period 1 (March 8, 2016 - November 8, 2016):
Cluster 1:
TrayneshaCole, BleepThePolice, WarfareWW, Jenn Abrams,
Blk Voice, blackmattersus, BlackToLive, hashed 68,
todayinsyria, TheFoundingSon
Cluster 2:
USA Gunslinger, TEN GOP, gloed up, Crystal1Johnson,
Cluster 3:
DailySanJose, hashed 37, NewspeakDaily, RoomOfRumor,
hashed 57, OaklandOnline, ScreamyMonkey,
KansasDailyNews,
Cluster 4:
DanaGeezus, GiselleEvns
Period 2 (November 29, 2016 - July 31, 2017)
Cluster 1:
hashed 19, hashed 39, DetroitDailyNew, DailySanJose,
hashed 55, hashed 54, hashed 12, hashed 44, hashed 1,
hashed 32, hashed 16, hashed 18, hashed 36, hashed 63,
hashed 4, hashed 33, hashed 28, hashed 46, hashed 77,
hashed 35, hashed 41, hashed 5, hashed 78, hashed 25,
hashed 38, hashed 2, hashed 61, hashed 60, hashed 21,
hashed 51, hashed 66, hashed 17, hashed 34, hashed 56,
hashed 62, hashed 40, hashed 24, hashed 9, hashed 47,
hashed 45, hashed 14, hashed 74, hashed 73, hashed 3,
hashed 58, hashed 13, hashed 31, hashed 71, hashed 67,
hashed 53, hashed 42, hashed 76, hashed 64, hashed 48,
hashed 27, hashed 59, hashed 8, hashed 15, hashed 43,
hashed 10, hashed 50, hashed 7, hashed 75, hashed 65,
hashed 69
Cluster 2:
TrayneshaCole, BleepThePolice, hashed 11, hashed 52,
TEN GOP, Jenn Abrams, hashed 29, ElPasoTopNews,
hashed 49, gloed up, blackmattersus, Crystal1Johnson,
BlackToLive, Pamela Moore13, hashed 30, hashed 26,
todayinsyria, BlackNewsOutlet, TheFoundingSon,
hashed 72
Cluster 3:
hashed 20, Seattle Post, DallasTopNews,
DailyLosAngeles, PhiladelphiaON, NewOrleansON,
TodayNYCity, TodayCincinnati, TodayMiami,
PhoenixDailyNew, ChicagoDailyNew, OnlineCleveland,
Baltimore0nline, Atlanta Online, TodayBostonMA,
TodayPittsburgh, DailySanFran, Politweecs,
DailySanDiego, WashingtOnline, OnlineMemphis,
HoustonTopNews, StLouisOnline, KansasDailyNews,
SanAntoTopNews
Cluster 4:
hashed 70, DanaGeezus, GiselleEvns, ChrixMorgan,
hashed 22, hashed 23, hashed 6
Appendix C: Topic Clustered Users for each Time
Period
Here user names are clustered according to the topic
about which they tweet during the two time periods.
Period 1 (March 8, 2016 - November 8, 2016):
Cluster 1
Blk Voice, Crystal1Johnson, blackmattersus
Cluster 2
DanaGeezus, GiselleEvns
Cluster 3
Jenn Abrams, TEN GOP, TheFoundingSon, USA Gunslinger
Cluster 4
BlackToLive, BleepThePolice, TrayneshaCole, gloed up
Cluster 5
DailySanJose, hashed 37, KansasDailyNews, hashed 57,
NewspeakDaily, OaklandOnline, hashed 68, RoomOfRumor,
ScreamyMonkey, WarfareWW, todayinsyria
Period 2 (November 29, 2016 - July 31, 2017)
Cluster 1
14
ChrixMorgan, DanaGeezus, GiselleEvns
Cluster 2
hashed 5, hashed 9, hashed 7, hashed 8, hashed 10,
hashed 18, hashed 21, hashed 25, hashed 27, hashed 33,
hashed 35, hashed 39, hashed 41, hashed 43, hashed 45,
hashed 51, hashed 56, hashed 62, hashed 69, hashed 71,
hashed 76, hashed 78, hashed 1, hashed 53, hashed 55
Cluster 3
Atlanta Online, Baltimore0nline, BlackNewsOutlet,
BleepThePolice, ChicagoDailyNew, Crystal1Johnson,
DailyLosAngeles, hashed 20, DailySanDiego,
DailySanFran, DailySanJose, DallasTopNews,
DetroitDailyNew, ElPasoTopNews, HoustonTopNews,
KansasDailyNews, NewOrleansON, OnlineCleveland,
OnlineMemphis, PhiladelphiaON, PhoenixDailyNew,
Politweecs, SanAntoTopNews, Seattle Post, hashed 72,
StLouisOnline, TodayBostonMA, TodayCincinnati,
TodayMiami, TodayNYCity, TodayPittsburgh,
TrayneshaCole, WashingtOnline, blackmattersus,
gloed up
Cluster 4
hashed 4, hashed 6, hashed 16, hashed 17, hashed 19,
hashed 23, hashed 24, hashed 26, hashed 36, hashed 38,
hashed 44, Jenn Abrams, hashed 47, hashed 50,
Pamela Moore13, hashed 60, hashed 63, hashed 70, TEN GOP,
TheFoundingSon, hashed 75, hashed 22, hashed 28,
hashed 32, todayinsyria
Cluster 5
hashed 2, hashed 46, hashed 49, hashed 52, hashed 14,
hashed 29, hashed 30
Cluster 6
BlackToLive, hashed 11, hashed 42, hashed 61, hashed 64,
hashed 12, hashed 54
Cluster 7
hashed 3, hashed 13, hashed 15, hashed 31, hashed 40,
hashed 58, hashed 59, hashed 65, hashed 67, hashed 73,
hashed 77, hashed 34, hashed 48, hashed 66, hashed 74
Appendix D: Hashed Usernames
hashed 1
71db45e4783602194ced17d50c4070036dfc754e9557fe918b39e58e8bf7d65b
hashed 2
1cd9dcae39203ce9df705a6ff0cb4b1961effb11c9959e48055606a108fedd44
hashed 3
f0a624171ca1c8d3177521f1362bf9eb78f1015ec3085a1eefdfa3ff9dbf73cb
hashed 4
cfb0d237487ebe3520cb83bd82df903c9c7afd5a60acba8a3576bc3ca9346467
hashed 5
efbb959a308f1bd1199a15221511bdd9e8945a3a02da83ce9d6585224733a8f6
hashed 6
8da5d23207d302647d84c4f38e4c9c48b199d9aa1cb0549940629a68b50b16cf
hashed 7
70007b94f796e3b39c18da7711327730b9e58032323c6e7b8438fc9c6acf835c
hashed 8
d225180304e4fafe5af936306b254e2cf5f2a950d6947f94c6ab44f7d51e2606
hashed 9
e35cc49080427faaf1f73e41752c5fea35a96f6c243863cd60b019661950c27e
hashed 10
8e58ab0f46d273103d9e71aa92cdaffb6e330ec7d15ae5fa79c825e2d6f291bf
hashed 11
d3f6e58202566043d909d57584be4811916859c8a09ebbe3b5239f72596d9acf
hashed 12
c465bceee4e65cc392661fafdecabc98450eb1f0b67e66a5a0d69be631f34ca5
hashed 13
14882528f53ed4b8fbadce206679b89258e363212b5a63f31777f4e93e1a5ccf
hashed 14
ef983249ef6ed5de427c4dc19ad6d966c6cf572c2505e44142e7e7261f917ae6
hashed 15
3da8a7609e8e8bbc93fb2051c4d6568ad5436d629d003735f217ecd3acd1bb7e
hashed 16
0994abf9fb8fe1bf699d0e101e9603b30f369e94a0eec1109e2f654b1a9c5caf
hashed 17
80f92e973543912617d5c7ec3bc42bd455b6970b7a52416f398ce923389d3a85
hashed 18
3f22ec97e6f7c68c28e59390710135dbfd067aa024eeb34f13dbb905b4dde4a5
hashed 19
a95a911dd6ae864c48ed062cdbe75e5c28dbe0cf57c6db3fa9dd53b654ee9845
hashed 20
8a73099860c2a4790ae6899381c0c327462e626c02ce0d3c899ce6058135786a
hashed 21
88669ad69e40d7c199af91e8107f1e0e7988d377d2e41fff77182bf42f31a1ed
hashed 22
99299a75c967aa491b27d86a60c2ffe0a6156d1b0dcb4487917f48e7e1c7ef78
hashed 23
2aae433624dcea729731ff8e44b0bdedc56e7cc9eea9bedd14bb264b07eedd5c
hashed 24
815561925624b72a95321d039bf8bdf0da5620f8475e62ce2dee37beb71abcab
hashed 25
40bd0ff013b85c7646ca07ad238bc4dc865ce2cc87034af6e7884e69481f6422
hashed 26
dce04b9807276c27a04ad521e37f061bcdfc8bc46cc6dc3d47128b263bd61124
hashed 27
a4df865b62425d5eb91b169b0bbb873434078a44b193174962a65408ed66d793
hashed 28
5ad1a4ad9a7d67c045ab752c7a946a9d847d5d7e03684174835269a193c2820e
hashed 29
f656411ab6d63685f868421c4b381779ce97b3470f701edf9ca9ebb5a0226e3d
hashed 30
21c35c77715644e10675df5bb88f02d40412785ace111edda73b40553db68bed
hashed 31
0dea399346f2f1a94e11fbc84897a35f1ccd3fcde6ea5f0e207ba0b296412e47
hashed 32
396b0b6914e425ca53c49b7f1d6cfe9757eb7368c04c657a09d83b19a8f1251e
hashed 33
beb24c4d724cb8a986f15f48e11895e7e3484598a54af5a0fef356ceb3641193
hashed 34
be762d9f6e6423c2b11320bd7b4d6abad8aed0f8a8a54f86350d0a584117eb25
hashed 35
e1c4cd815926b92691660738cd682335520a24fb08765655c261b07ef591b653
hashed 36
5788d958456ab731e042dfff6d344829c158409c1c0911d79a5de12b0a72ced1
hashed 37
fea5e166786f00c893ee247a87ab6047e3ed8727dbe4b5a67b64484dc777b070
hashed 38
ec2109adb67d2a24091026d5d9aab64dadca1fdb2f7355473c9a82f988a9c2a0
hashed 39
6791992ed85cd2e739f57d9e4f1a4d1ac119577cdece986e1e049ade25c2d793
hashed 40
8a3c0cdcac971eaf9f7802a5688faea3aadd850e5d2e214941c2ccbdcaf4ac32
hashed 41
5f452585194266b94e60c99e1dd07f808ceb2b26b10cfb939c2e5ad47888be1c
hashed 42
3c46bd68165bb49be66c657de7f09b1cbd130e65934abd29f5aec28e2a86d43d
hashed 43
e579b30026998948100e534d656b6f27770e519fab233bccaf8b6c18b4a862c8
hashed 44
0e45d2af1bbca512ab1d8fa1c2216c038f9627bb773ab4cbe351404ee7a2c93e
hashed 45
e8e7c2bfdb7272a4a7db5dfcbb01627222d934054e99469baba6a2fe5edb9f92
hashed 46
afe3c426e91f3f0e507f9cf7beceeddb2537f56e4fd3b2aab12f87fc6eee3edd
hashed 47
aa80df35407d74929dc17b058bdc679ae7f995c237f1cfd09915d970d72f72c1
hashed 48
3434652527f405b7fd0a49064a0760dc11c1eaf80a42b7c8afc800d6a3612ce2
hashed 49
6183ad40df50200d0001e2b2e0acfcdb1d5f71ddee9495874a3b1fa2b00b6e25
hashed 50
93a00b4e2d4198865a35726aab0d5c1a4205301471411a85054b714b3b89c4a9
hashed 51
fb6f6cc1a31b47965d9894b89d576add7a679a77e9022aad33d6c0c2310cd789
hashed 52
6ca21c26de8159386b71428b8bdadf732bd854614dadea9086770b71bbe1df6a
hashed 53
77755623608ac46aacd68d114868ffebad0b2cbd4d29f0fe99143d93d51864ad
hashed 54
0a0af8893cdc8454338447004eeaf65ee2934977c71ec48d3bb17e6723e1daef
hashed 55
cfe9315d7429aedb7f843a165185d91f0ae819e54026d8a22a4f6e539f5e9132
hashed 56
274d180d1de8828a8e3e7f62eec224ba9e3d04481e5d9eb29bf1cab882004a1b
hashed 57
080da9e6b0c293d8e7abe6115605790ec8bc9a5c75a2b3e60539e67e3f100875
hashed 58
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hashed 59
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hashed 60
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hashed 61
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hashed 62
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hashed 63
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hashed 64
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hashed 65
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hashed 66
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hashed 67
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hashed 68
9ebdcf10ebedc9abf33a34e07792e18230ecd26cea77ab0f3fcdfac11fe2116f
hashed 69
eafd6b68b8855efe312fbb60d5fde0edb8632e9c0364f5044d999b0ee58837a8
hashed 70
a396435b41bb21c018281c802df9fa8d1a1eaa9b5b139c72bc1114ca62871b9c
hashed 71
21ede93ad40450cf820f249bde68d4622b61894a6597de8c6290f034acc8f059
hashed 72
aba127107267464101355d3465e86aafe41aaa31395bf82b3eb2fb801efac56f
hashed 73
8773aaa8badf887f0702db4c5c8fe1e45ff82e35ce867539fd26e9dbf804b27f
hashed 74
190df5183c66fcdf2efe5a11eb35cc827a5f0726f4788b3ee5d3aadaeeb28dbf
hashed 75
74c5eb30de3d6691e150879ee8528463c70b0feaefed9766fcbbcc8b2458221a
hashed 76
83216c1bdaf0245f9ac5b98a8c4b3cf2a1634b74d8b38dce5641f292a56c10d6
hashed 77
85fdb02196bb8c19d03a262e72132e5c8ec70bde25eaea167f012f0bc1becbf8
hashed 78
c7b1bacb73f0f3025dc09452d99b1abb22a5ce7aa0a649330f3820de07f2ecde
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